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Abstract 
Motivated by Schipper and Vincent’s (2003) comment that comparability in financial 
reporting is under-researched, this paper analyses the comparability construct in the 
context of pension accounting.  In practice, compromises or rules introduced into pension 
accounting standards are not based on principles but result from political bargaining 
(Daley and Tranter, 1990). Current pension accounting standards in the USA, Australia 
and the international pension accounting standard are compared using a “theoretical” 
benchmark to present the economic substance of the transaction. To develop the 
theoretical benchmark, Barth and Clinch’s (1996) use of Ohlson’s (1989) clean surplus 
model is adapted to articulate the sponsor’s profit and loss and balance sheet so that 
compromises are highlighted. This paper concludes that a principles-based approach that 
emphasises the economic substance and clean surplus approach need not necessarily 
compromise comparability. 
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1. Introduction 
The debate about principles versus rules-based accounting standards focuses attention on 
the desirable qualitative characteristics of financial information and other conventions 
described in (conceptual) frameworks. In particular, it is argued that comparability and 
consistency declines as the use of principles-based accounting standards increases 
relative to rules or compliance-based accounting standards (SEC 2003, note 14).1 This is 
because principles-based accounting standards generally require the preparers and 
auditors to use judgement in the absence of sufficient guidance to exercise that 
judgement. Bennett, Bradbury and Prangnell (2006, p.191) provide tentative support for 
the perception that principles-based accounting standards may require more professional 
judgement.2 They also report differences in the weightings of framework criteria such as 
comparability and substance over form. For example, Bennett et al. (2006, p.200) report 
that comparability is referenced more frequently in the rules-based accounting standard 
while substance over form is emphasised in the principles-based accounting standards.  
 
Pension accounting standards in the USA and Australia were subject to substantial social 
and political debate during their development. As a result, the pension accounting 
standard issued in the USA (SFAS 87 Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, 1985) and 
the Australian standard that was in place before convergence with international standards 
                                                 
1 The IASB Framework (paras 39-42) defines comparability as enabling users to discern similarities and 
differences between the nature and effect of transactions (in cross-section and longitudinal). While 
comparability may presuppose consistency of accounting treatment for like transactions, consistency should not 
impede accounting innovations if relevance and reliability are improved. That is, consistency is not an end in 
itself. 
2 This finding is based on Bennett et al’s (2006) limited comparative analysis of one purportedly rules-
based and two purportedly principles-based accounting standards. They acknowledge that the distinction 
between principles and rules-based accounting standards is not unambiguous and conclude that this 
distinction is only meaningful in relative terms. 
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(AASB 1028 Employee Benefits, 1995) contain accounting concessions and detailed 
rules to suit local needs. 3  A principles-based approach commonly emphasises 
representation of the economic substance of the pension transaction (in the presence of 
increased judgement by the preparers and auditors) at the expense of other principles, 
such as comparability and uniformity. On the other hand, a rules-based approach 
traditionally requires less judgement by focusing on the detailed rules contained in the 
pension accounting standards (for example, the “corridor” method of deferral of actuarial 
gains and losses) and emphasizing comparability to support the application of these rules. 
The pension accounting concessions (such as the “corridor” method), if not based on 
principles, reduce the user’s ability to understand the links between the sponsor’s income 
statement, balance sheet and actuarial position of the defined benefit plan (DBP) and 
erode representation of the economic substance of the pension transaction. In such 
circumstances, it remains difficult to assess or “measure” comparability. Schipper and 
Vincent (2003, p.104) note that the comparability construct is not well researched. 
Schipper (2003) suggests that, as a first step, an assessment of the understanding of the 
current state of comparability is needed.  
 
Following Schipper’s (2003) suggestion, the objective of this paper is to examine the 
extent of comparability among the pension accounting standards developed in the USA, 
Australia and by the International Accounting Standards Board.  In doing so, the pension 
accounting standards that emerged from each of those jurisdictions are compared using a 
“theoretical” benchmark (the “full” economic substance view) to represent the economic 
                                                 
3 The international standard IAS 19 and the Australian equivalent standard AASB 119 Employee Benefits 
are closely modelled on the US standard with similar concessions.  
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substance of the transaction. To develop the theoretical benchmark, Barth and Clinch’s 
(1996) use of Ohlson’s (1989) “clean surplus” model is adapted to articulate the 
sponsor’s income statement and balance sheet. 4 In practice, compromise introduced into 
pension accounting standards (for example, the “corridor” method) detracts from the full 
economic substance view and interrupts the articulation of the sponsor’s earnings and the 
balance sheet. That is, concessions such as the corridor method do not emerge from the 
underlying economics of the pension transaction and so may bias reporting because good 
practice and fair presentation may be overlooked. The principles-based approach in 
conjunction with clean surplus pension accounting (that restricts the role of the preparer’s 
judgement) provides a practical way of assessing comparability.5  
 
This paper contributes to the rules versus principles-based accounting standards debate 
by proposing the use of a theoretical benchmark to assess the comparability of pension 
accounting standards. Even though comparability may feature more prominently in rules-
based accounting standards and the economic substance in principles-based accounting 
standards, this paper represents the economic substance of the pension transaction in 
conjunction with clean surplus accounting (that is, without political compromise) and 
uses this as a benchmark to assess comparability of pension accounting standards. To this 
extent, comparability is a relative concept. While application of the economic substance 
principle generally results in increased professional judgement, use of clean surplus 
                                                 
4 Barth and Clinch (1996, p.139) use the extent to which accounting rules permit the articulation of the income 
statement with the balance sheet to compare US GAAP to Australian, UK and Canadian GAAP. Pension accounting 
is one of the accounting issues investigated by them. 
5 Another alternative is to use the international pension accounting standard as the benchmark (but this 
would require justification). 
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pension accounting substantially restricts the flexibility of this professional judgement 
because political compromises are excluded.  
 
This paper represents a first attempt to assess comparability in the context of current 
pension accounting standards and concludes that a principles-based approach that 
emphasizes the economic substance and clean surplus approach need not necessarily 
compromise comparability. On the other hand, rules-based accounting standards do not 
necessarily improve comparability if the rules are not based on principles (Nobes, 2005, 
p.10). The implication for future research is that further refinement between the terms 
“rules-based” and “principles-based” accounting standards is required. In particular, a 
clearer distinction between accounting rules that result from political compromise (as is 
the case for pension accounting) and rules that flow from principles is necessary if 
qualitative attributes of financial information, such as comparability, are to be 
investigated. This paper is also timely as international accounting standard-setters revisit 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits, partly due to poor comparability of accounting for post-
employment benefit information (see IASB Press Release 27 March 2008). 
 
2. Context of Pension Accounting 
The economic substance over legal form principle is particularly useful to pension 
accounting because it defines the boundaries between the sponsor firm’s economic entity 
and the DBP using a duality that requires different accounting solutions. Miller (1987a) 
characterizes pension accounting as either the economic substance approach or the legal 
form approach. Miller (1987a) describes the economic substance view where there is a 
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close nexus between the plan and the sponsoring employer. The sponsor and the DBP 
trust are viewed as one economic entity and the employer is responsible to meet the 
pension commitments. Consistent with this view, the net pension asset/liability should be 
reflected in the sponsor’s balance sheet with the year-to-year difference shown in the 
sponsor’s earnings. That is, the pension expense should correspond with the underlying 
economic event, namely the funding position of the pension plan (i.e. the excess/shortfall 
of plan assets over accrued benefits) is reflected in the sponsor’s balance sheet and the 
change in that position is reflected in the sponsor’s income statement. In this way, the 
economic substance view relates the pension expense to the fund’s liabilities and assets 
by a consideration of normal service cost, interest expense on the liabilities and return on 
assets. Under the economic substance view, funding the pension plan is therefore merely 
a shift of resources within the broader economic entity. In contrast, the legal entity form 
view considers that the DBP is a separate legal entity distinct from the sponsor.  Under 
the legal entity view, the sponsor’s obligation to the DBP is discharged when the 
contribution is paid in cash to the DBP and it is not necessary to recognise the net 
financial position of the pension plan in the sponsor’s balance sheet.  
 
The legal form versus economic substance framework relates the underwriting of the 
investment risk of the DBP by the sponsor to the accounting for the DBP in the sponsor’s 
books. Figure 1 summarises the application of the economic substance over legal form 
principle to pension accounting. The first part of Figure 1 summarises the principles-
based (or conceptual framework) approach to pension accounting, starting with the 
objective of pension accounting by sponsors and deriving principles that should guide 
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good (pension) accounting. Applying the economic substance over legal form principle to 
accounting for pensions implies that the nature of the relationship between the sponsor 
and the fund determines the apposite accounting treatment for the DBP. In this way, 
pension accounting by sponsors is seen as a function of the relationship between the fund 
and the sponsor. Referring to Figure 1, if the DBP is viewed as integrated into the broader 
economic entity of the sponsor and the sponsor is committed to fund any DBP deficit 
under the terms of the pension plan trust deed or otherwise, the appropriate accounting 
treatment of the DBP in the sponsor’s books is to recognise the deficit on the sponsor’s 
balance sheet.    
 
The usefulness of the pension accounting information is also dependent upon the 
characterisitics of financial information. Referring to Figure 1, comparability is one such 
desirable quality the pension accounting information should possess. Other desirable 
qualitative characteristics of financial information listed in Figure 1 and not investigated 
by this paper include relevance and reliability. The AASB Framework presents 
understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability as the four principal attributes 
that financial information should possess. Comparability refers to the relationship 
between two or more sets of information and should not undermine relevance and 
reliability so that accounting innovations are stifled. If inter-period consistency or 
uniformity of accounting treatment between entities is threatened, it may be necessary to 
provide additional disclosures about the accounting policies adopted or valuation 
methodologies used. On the other hand, if relevance and reliability dominate, decision-
usefulness to investors may decline due to the lack of comparability between entities. The 
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qualitative characteristics of information are relevant to principles-based accounting 
standards because they establish a set of criteria that useful information should possess, 
rather than list a set of rules or conventions based on general consent. Rules-based 
standards encourage compliance in form, not in substance (Finnerty, 1988).  
                                                (Insert Figure 1 here)   
 
However, political compromises often enter the accounting standard-setting process to 
build consensus and support for the proposed standard, which inevitably lead to standards 
that encompass pragmatic concessions rather than consistency with accounting principles.  
By contrast with the principles-based approach to pension accounting, the second part of 
Figure 1 summarises some of the outcomes if political processes intervene and rules-
based accounting standards result. For example, in relation to measuring the amount of 
pension expense in the sponsor’s balance sheet, the FASB’s initial position in 
Preliminary Views was immediate recognition of the change in net plan assets. However, 
when SFAS 87 was ultimately issued, it permitted smoothing of the pension expense via 
the “corridor” method. This concession was made to allay concerns by lobbyists that 
immediate recognition of the change in DBP funding position would cause undesirable 
volatility in the sponsors’ earnings (Lambert and Gallery, 1996).  The FASB 
acknowledged that both the extent of volatility reduction and the mechanism adopted to 
effect it are essentially practical issues without conceptual basis (SFAS 87, para. 177). 
One of the dissenting FASB members rejected these smoothing mechanisms on the 
grounds that they introduce unnecessary flexibility into the process, and in turn, such 
flexibility diminishes improvements in the comparability of financial statement 
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information that SFAS 87 would otherwise have effected (SFAS 87, p. 24). Therefore, 
there is no assurance that the rules-based accounting compromises will lead to increased 
comparability of financial reporting (as illustrated in the second part of Figure 1).  
 
3. Brief History of Pension Accounting 
Pension accounting standards in the USA (and Australia) have been subject to significant 
social, economic and political scrutiny (Daley and Tranter, 1990, p.15). Due to this 
scrutiny, accounting concessions are evident in the pension accounting standard in the 
USA. As a consequence, SFAS 87 is generally regarded as being rules-based rather than 
principles-based.6  More recently, as pension accounting standards converge to IFRS, 
most pension accounting standards aspire to the economic substance approach.  
 
Miller’s (1987a) characterisation of the economic relationship between the sponsor and 
the DBP as the legal form approach (where the plan is a separate legal entity distinct from 
the employer) and the economic substance approach (where the plan is part of the 
economic entity of the employer) is used to analyse accounting regulations for the 
accounting for DBP by the sponsor. The application of the economic substance over legal 
form principle to the accounting for DBP by the sponsor in the USA, Australia and 
international accounting standard IAS 19 highlights the compromises evident in pension 
accounting standards.  
 
 
                                                 
6 The AAA FASC (2003) presents how SFAS 87 would look if it were to be based on a principles-based 
approach. The number of concessions in SFAS 87 runs counter to Barth and Clinch’s (1987, p. 139) 
assertion that most accounting rules in the USA articulate the income statement and the balance sheet. 
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USA 
The debate on pension accounting in the USA has a long history. The first pension 
accounting standards appeared in 1948, 1956 and 1966 in the USA. These early standards 
focus on the earnings  impact of pension accounting, and in particular the accounting for 
past service cost and actuarial gains and losses. Under Opinion No.8 (effective 1966) the 
recognition of a pension asset / liability was restricted to the prepaid / accrued 
contribution expense or transition adjustments on business combinations, consistent with 
the legal perspective.  The employer’s obligation to the DBP was discharged at the time of 
funding. An unfunded deficit was not considered a liability of the sponsor but as “an 
anticipated shortfall in future normal contributions” (Ezra, 1980, p.48). 7   
 
SFAS 36 Disclosure of Pension Information was issued in May 1980 as an interim 
amendment to Opinion No.8 and required the disclosure of information about unfunded 
accumulated pension benefits.  In the USA, the enactment of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 penalised employers that withdrew from unfunded 
plans, reinforcing the idea that pension liabilities should appear on the employers’ balance 
sheets. ERISA also secured the vesting of accrued benefits by employees, implying that 
unfunded vested benefits are liabilities of the employer because there is little discretion 
for the sponsor to avoid payment. At this time, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) added the pension topic to its agenda and issued Preliminary Views on 
Employers’ Accounting for Pensions and Other Post-employment Benefits (1982). 
                                                 
7 The actuary’s objective is to define the liability for future contributions, not to define an accounting 
liability. This difference of opinion helps explain why the accounting profession supports recognition of the 
pension liability on the balance sheet of the plan as well as the sponsor, while the actuarial profession is 
opposed to the idea. 
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Preliminary Views represented a major change from Opinion No.8 because it adopted the 
economic substance approach and required the capitalisation of previously unrecorded 
pension obligations. While the US accounting profession initially supported the 
principles-based recording of the economic substance of the transaction contained in 
Preliminary Views, the political process of standard-setting has since acted to water-down 
these requirements so that SFAS 87 has a number of accounting concessions or 
compromises characteristic of rules-based standard-setting (Daley and Tranter, 1990, p. 
15; Wallison, Financial Times, 6 July 2007).   
 
The compromises included in SFAS 87 are the “corridor” method of amortisation of 
actuarial gains and losses and recognition of the “minimum” liability. To minimise the 
volatility of the pension cost induced by fluctuations in actuarial gains and losses due to 
market movements, standard setters in US endorse the corridor method (Revsine, Collins 
and Johnson, 2002, p.701). SFAS 87 para. 32 permits recognition of actuarial gains and 
losses outside a 10% corridor (if net cumulative unrecognised actuarial gains and losses 
exceed the greater of 10% of the projected benefit obligation or 10% of the fair value of 
plan assets). 8  The corridor method is essentially a delayed recognition or smoothing 
technique designed to reduce the reporting of large unexpected pension expenses. It has 
been criticised because it is arbitrary and deferred actuarial gains / losses do not comply 
with the definitions of assets / liabilities (Gordon, 2001, p. 58). The width of the corridor 
of 10% is arbitrary. Immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses is also permitted 
                                                 
8 The minimum amount that an entity should recognise is the part that fell outside the corridor at the end of 
the previous reporting period, divided by the expected average remaining working lives of the employees 
participating in that plan. The interval +10% acts as a corridor within which gains and losses are not 
recognised (Dufresne, 1993, p.2). 
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by SFAS 87 provided it is consistent and the method disclosed. The corridor method 
illustrates how compromise by standard-setters interrupts the articulation of the income 
statement and balance sheets.  
 
Another compromise in SFAS 87 includes the minimum liability. This is calculated as the 
excess of the accumulated benefit obligation, without salary projection, over the fair value 
of pension assets for each plan. A different index is used in the balance sheet (without 
salary projection) than in the profit and loss (with salary projection). Further, the 
minimum liability represents a direct-to-equity adjustment.9 SFAS 87 requires the use of 
deferred asset / liability accounts plus memorandum records to force the articulation of the 
income statement with the balance sheet.10 However, SFAS 87 does not require an asset 
be recognised when the fair value of pension assets exceeds the accumulated benefit 
obligation. An intangible asset account is created as an offset to the additional minimum 
liability and this asset account cannot exceed the amount of unrecognised prior service 
cost. 11  The extensive disclosures required by SFAS 87 were simplified in 1998 with the 
issue of FAS 132 Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement 
Benefits. 
 
                                                 
9 In the USA, SFAS 130 Reporting Comprehensive Income (effective 15 December 1997) specifically 
excludes the minimum required pension liability adjustment from net income.  
10 In the long run, total pension expense equals total cash contributions to the DBP. In the short run, 
estimates of variables due to uncertainty, assumptions and smoothing techniques (such as the corridor 
method) corrupt this equality. 
11 Any excess of the unrecognised prior service cost over the intangible asset amount is treated as a 
reduction in stockholder’s equity. The intangible asset is amortised over the expected future years of 
service of active participants. The decision to offset the minimum liability with an intangible asset account 
results in the anomaly of creating an asset to recognise a loss on plan assets. 
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The increasing number of reported deficits in company sponsored DBP increases 
concerns in the USA that the DBP deficit may trigger the SFAS 87 minimum liability and 
reduce shareholder’s equity. Reports in The Wall Street Journal (26 November 2002, p.1) 
state that some companies with debt covenants sensitive to pension accounting are re-
estimating the impact of pension liabilities on the levels of debt. Other US companies at 
that time (Delta Air Lines, Cummins Inc. and Kellogg Co.) reduced their debt or paid 
fees to amend the lending agreements to remove the effects of pension funding. 12   
General Motors Corporation’s debt-rating was downgraded by Standard and Poor due to 
pension shortfalls of $US23 billion (The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2002, p.1).  
 
While the recognition of any pension deficit is limited under SFAS 87, and the effects of 
changes in the DBP net assets are permitted to be smoothed in the income statement, 
SFAS requires full disclosure in the notes of details of pension plan assets, recognised 
and unrecognised accrued benefits, and components of recognised and unrecognised 
pension expense. Those disclosures are complex. Coronado and Sharpe (2003) 
investigated whether, in the absence of full recognition of the financial effects of the 
pension expense and net pension asset/liability in the financial statements,  market 
participants are able to interpret the detailed pension disclosures and appropriately 
incorporate them into the pricing of the firm. Coronado and Sharpe (2003) found that 
during the period when many US firms’ pension plans went into deficit, by the end of 
2001 firms were, on average, overvalued by 10%. They argue this overvaluation resulted 
from pension-induced errors caused by the complicated pension numbers (derived in 
                                                 
12 Other actions by employers faced with unfunded deficits include making additional contributions, 
amending the plan or its measurement date or changing actuarial assumptions (for example, a one 
percentage point reduction in the discount rate can increase fund liabilities by as much as 15 to 20 percent). 
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accordance with SFAS 87) included in earnings, creating distortions in market values of 
equity. An inference that can be drawn from these findings is that if the market is unable 
to appropriately price recognised pension numbers and pension information disclosed in 
notes under SFAS 87, then equally, that recognised and disclosed information inhibits 
comparisons between entities.  
 
International Pension Accounting Standard IAS 19 
International Accounting Standard IAS 19 Retirement Costs was issued in 1983, revised in 1993 
and 1998 (effective May 1999), renamed Employee Benefits and revised 2000 and 2002. At this 
time, in Europe, reports of DBP under-funding were also causing concern (Business Week, 2 
December 2002, p.54). IAS 19 requires the recognition of the net pension position on the 
sponsor’s balance sheet and requires that employers not restrict the recognition of DBP liabilities 
to only legal liabilities but include constructive obligations emerging from informal practices 
with employees to preserve the employer-employee relationship (IAS 19, para.52). Aside from 
permitting companies to delay recognition of net plan assets, an upper limit is placed on the 
value of the pension asset not to exceed any unrecognised actuarial losses and past service cost 
and the present value of any economic benefits from reductions in contributions or refunds.  
 
IAS 19 is also flexible because it permits selection of one of three methods of recognising 
actuarial gains and losses: the corridor approach (or some other systematic write-off of 
actuarial gains and losses provided the same basis is applied to gains and losses and it is 
applied consistently over time), immediate recognition in the income statement, or an 
adjustment directly to equutiy. However, the corridor method conflicts with the European 
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Community Fourth Directive (Articles 31.1 (c)(bb) and 31.1(d)) because 10% of a known 
liability is not being recognised at balance date.  
 
Australia 
Until recently, measurement and recognition requirements for accounting for DBP costs 
in the books of the sponsoring employer did not exist in Australia. Prior to AASB 119, 
there were no requirements to use accrual accounting to allocate the pension cost on a 
consistent basis across those periods expected to benefit from the employees’ services. 
The requirement for the employer to recognise the net pension position in the balance 
sheet was also absent. Instead, sponsoring companies were required to disclose 
information about their DBP under AASB 1028 Accounting for Employee Entitlements 
(effective June 1995) (para. 6.10).13
 
It was not until 1991 that an exposure draft on accounting for superannuation by the 
employer (ED 53 Accounting for Employee Entitlements) was issued in Australia. ED 53 
adopted the economic substance approach, proposing that the sponsor recognise the net 
pension position in its balance sheet as a pension asset/liability (surplus/deficit), and 
recognise the change in the balance of the asset/liability in the income statement. ED 53 
met with strong opposition from the superannuation industry and the actuarial profession 
in Australia (Lambert and Gallery, 1996). The approach in ED 53 is consistent with the 
economic substance view that there is a close nexus between the fund and the employer, 
                                                 
13 AASB 1028 para.6.10 requires the sponsor disclose for each DBP and in aggregate, accrued benefits, the 
net market value of the plan assets and the difference between plan assets and accrued benefits and vested 
benefits. Disclosure of the dates at which these amounts are measured is also required, along with the 
accounting policy, including any amounts recognized in the sponsoring employers’ financial statements. 
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and accordingly, the employer is “morally” responsible to meet the superannuation 
commitments arising from the DBP arrangement.  Like Preliminary Views in the USA, 
the definition of liabilities in ED 53 was not restricted to include only legal liabilities but 
included equitable and constructive obligations to employees as well. Also, the market 
valuation of pension assets was also endorsed by ED 53 and the superannuation expense 
measured as the change in the net pension asset / liability already recognised (that, 
potentially, could induce volatility into the income statement). Due to the objections to 
ED 53 over concerns regarding the possible induced volatility of income coupled with the 
need to recognise any DBP deficits on the sponsor’s balance sheet, the accounting 
profession withdrew the superannuation accounting proposals and the accounting 
standard that was subsequently issued (AASB 1028) did not include any requirements for 
the recognition of superannuation balances by the sponsoring employer. 
 
It was not until 2005, when Australia adopted international accounting standards, that 
superannuation measurement and recognition requirements were introduced for 
companies sponsoring DBPs. AASB 119 classifies the components of the pension 
expense, excluding amounts capitalised as an asset, as current service cost, interest cost, 
expected return on plan assets, actuarial gains and losses, past service cost and the effect 
of any curtailments. Actuarial gains and losses (AGL) are also included in pension cost. 
AGL emerge to the extent that the actuary’s assumptions are not realized or if the 
assumptions change. AASB 119 (first draft) (effective 1 January 2005) did not support 
deferred or smoothing methods for the treatment of actuarial gains and losses permitted 
by SFAS 87 and IAS 19 because this reduces comparability (see the preface to Request 
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for Comment on IASB ED Proposed Amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits: 
Actuarial Gains and Losses, Group Plans and Disclosures, April 2004 (IASB ED)).14 
Thus the initially proposed version of AASB 119 was consistent with the economic 
substance approach of recognising the net DBP position by the employer sponsor, and 
immediate recognition of the changes in the net position.  
 
This requirement for immediate recognition of changes in the net DBP position in the 
sponsor’s income statement was subsequently removed from AASB 119. The AASB 
(2004) rationalised its ‘change of heart’ as follows:  
Although the AASB believes that the immediate recognition of actuarial gains 
and losses associated with defined benefit plans in profit or loss is the most 
conceptually sound and useful approach, the AASB considers that the IASB’s 
introduction of an additional option in its amendments to IAS 19 Standard creates 
uncertainty about the direction that the IASB will take on this issue in IAS 19 in 
the future. Accordingly, AASB 119 has been revised to allow all the options in 
IAS 19 to be used to account for actuarial gains and losses in relation to defined 
benefit plans. 
 
Accordingly, the second draft of AASB 119 (effective 1 January 2006) accommodates all 
alternatives for the treatment of AGL (that is, immediate recognition in the income 
statement, deferred recognition via the “corridor” method, or recognition directly in 
equity) in the interests of full convergence with international standards (IAS 19).   
 
With respect to accounting of the DBP net pension balance by the sponsor, consistent with IAS 
19, AASB 119 requires the recognition of the net pension deficit/asset on the sponsor’s balance 
                                                 
14 Consistent with this, the (previously constituted) Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) 
rejected the International Accounting Standards Committee’s (now the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB)) proposals on permitting choice of treatment of actuarial gains and losses because it 
compromised consistency and comparability of results between companies (see AARF Press Release, 23 
March 1998). 
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sheet. An argument against this requirement is that most Australian superannuation trust deeds 
provide for the sponsor to terminate the plan and there is no statutory obligation upon the 
employer to guarantee benefits. However, a few years prior to AASB 119, when large numbers 
of DBPs sponsored by Australian companies were in deficit, the Australian corporate regulator, 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), also adopted the similar 
approach that DBP deficits should be recognised as liabilities in the balance sheet of the 
sponsoring company. In media releases issued in 2003 ASIC urged sponsoring companies to 
ensure that their accounts  reflected the substance of the economic relationship between the 
sponsoring employer and the DBP (ASIC Media Release 03-127, 15 April 2003) and ensure this 
was correctly reported in the sponsor’s financial statements (ASIC Media Release 03-262, 21 
August 2003).  
 
Ambiguity also exists concerning the “ownership” of superannuation fund surpluses in Australia, 
due to industrial relation issues and the contributory nature of Australian DBPs. Prior to AASB 
119 sponsor companies were, in the presence of a surplus, permitted to take a contribution 
holiday (that is, to cease funding to the DBP and reduce the contribution expense in the 
sponsor’s profit and loss to zero).15 The upshot of applying accrual accounting to the pension 
cost in Australia (as in AASB 119) is that the sponsor cannot take a contribution holiday for 
accounting purposes (that is, report a zero pension expense in the profit and loss). There is also 
evidence of diverse practice of accounting for surplus by Australian companies in the early 
1990s (for example, Westpac and Comalco).16 Unlike their overseas counterparts, Australian 
                                                 
15  DBP surplus for Australian funds arose due to selective vesting practices, lack of portability of benefits 
and favourable stock market performance. 
16 The total surplus recognised in Westpac’s balance sheet in 1991 (credited to the profit and loss as an 
abnormal item) was $685.0m. This figure is material when compared to Westpac’s operating profit before 
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sponsors do not have unfettered access to the DBP surplus. Gallery and Gallery (2006) find that 
the market prices DBP deficits, but not surpluses, indicating that the market views deficits as 
liabilities, while surpluses are not considered assets of the sponsoring company.  
 
4. Comparison of Pension Accounting Standards in the USA, Australia and the 
International Standard using a Theoretical Benchmark   
 
Barth and Clinch’s adaptation of Ohlson’s (1989) “clean surplus” model is used to compare 
current pension accounting standards in the USA, Australia and international accounting 
standard. For the purpose of analysis (and to represent the differences of accounting 
practice), four incarnations of the economic substance view to pension accounting in the 
sponsor’s books are identified: the full economic substance, the first and second modified 
economic substance views and the mixed approach. Current accounting standards are 
positioned relative to the full economic substance view. 
 
The first version of AASB 119 (issued in July 2004) is consistent with the full economic 
substance view (see Table 1, column 1). Preliminary Views in the USA and ED 53 in 
Australia are also consistent with the full economic substance view for accounting for 
interests in DBP by the sponsor. To the extent that the other accounting standards depart 
from the full economic substance view, the articulation of the balance sheet and the income 
statement is interrupted. The version of IAS 19 before IASB ED adopted the first modified 
economic substance view and required the recognition of the net pension position on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(after) abnormals for 1991 of $428.4m ($358.1m). Similarly, Comalco first recorded the DBP surplus of 
$174.3m as an asset in its 1991 accounts, with the credit classified as an extraordinary item in the profit and 
loss. This resulted in Comalco’s 1991 accounts being challenged by the then regulator, the ASC who 
considered the item abnormal, not extraordinary. 
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sponsor’s balance sheet (see Table 1, column 2). The first modified economic substance view 
permits a number of options for AGL in the income statement, including deferral of AGL 
using the corridor method but with no direct-to-retained earnings adjustment on an on-going 
basis. The second modified economic substance view (AASB 119 (December 2004) and IAS 
19 (after IASB ED) permits all three options for AGL (either immediate or deferred 
recognition in the income statement or in the second performance statement).  
 
                                                   (Insert Table 1 here) 
 
SFAS 87 is best described as a mixed approach (see Table 1, column 4) and makes 
compromises as it departs from the full economic substance viewpoint.  For example, the net 
pension asset, unrecognised AGL and unrecognised past service costs are not recorded by the 
sponsor. Also, the SFAS 87 minimum liability is calculated using a different index in the 
balance sheet (accumulated pension benefit measure) than in the profit and loss (projected 
benefit measure). Further, the minimum liability represents a direct-to-equity adjustment. 
This less than pure approach by SFAS 87 requires the use of deferred asset/liability accounts 
plus memorandum records to force the articulation of the profit and loss with the balance 
sheet.17 At the other extreme, the legal entity form view is much narrower and does not 
record the net pension position in the sponsor’s balance sheet, nor does it use accrual 
accounting to record the ongoing pension cost (see Table 1, column 5). 
 
                                                 
17 In the long run, total pension expense equals total cash contributions to the DBP. In the short run, estimates of 
variables due to uncertainty, assumptions and smoothing techniques (such as the corridor method) corrupt this 
equality. 
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A review of Table 1 highlights the extent of permissible alternative accounting treatments in 
the pension accounting standards. The full economic substance view minimises managerial 
judgement by disallowing optional accounting treatments. This increases the comparability 
of accounting information by reducing the uncertainty of the economic impact of the pension 
transaction.18 On the other hand, SFAS 87, AASB 119 (December 2004) and IAS 19 (2004) 
permit smoothing options for the treatment of AGL. Also, SFAS 87 has an option to smooth 
pension deficits. The accounting options for the treatment of AGL increase managerial 
judgement by increasing flexibility of accounting choice. From the financial statement user’s 
perspective, these optional accounting treatments increase uncertainty surrounding the 
economic impact of the pension transaction and reduce comparability. The AARF rejected 
the (then-named) IASC’s proposals on choice of treatment of AGL because it compromised 
consistency and comparability of results between companies (AARF Press Release, 23 
March 1998). Additional disclosure is necessary to reduce this uncertainty. 
 
On the other hand, the preparer’s focus centres on the volatility introduced into the income 
statement from AGL due to movements in market prices. The optional accounting treatments 
for AGL beg the question: What is the nature of AGL? Under an exit price model, the 
internally consistent approach is to recognise AGL as an expense or revenue item as incurred 
in the income statement. This is also consistent with the full economic substance view. 
Delayed recognition of AGL, such as the corridor method, is difficult to justify under an exit 
price valuation model. The alternative view is that AGL do not represent enhancements or 
losses of future economic benefits but result from the re-measurement and changes in the 
value of assets and liabilities from external market sources. Under this view, AGL do not 
                                                 
18 This assumes that the net pension position is fairly presented in the sponsor’s balance sheet. 
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represent performance measures for management but result from the re-measurement of plan 
assets and liabilities shown in a second performance statement or as a direct-to-equity 
adjustment. To this extent, it is inconsistent to apply the economic substance over form 
principle and recognise the net pension position on the balance sheet and at the same time 
claim that AGL should be excluded from performance measurements of management.  
 
Departures from the full economic substance view result largely from tensions between the 
preparer of the financial statements and the users of these statements. Political compromise 
in the pension accounting context results in rules that lack principles and reduce 
comparability. Tabulating accounting standards relative to their departure from the economic 
substance benchmark as in Table 1 is a first step to assessing comparability across 
accounting standards. In practice, it is possible to calculate on an individual company basis 
the extent of deviation, in dollar terms, of their profit and loss pension calculation from the 
calculation that would result using the theoretical or full economic substance benchmark.   
 
5. Conclusion  
The stated overarching objective of accounting standard-setters is to enhance the user’s 
ability to understand the link between the actuarial position of the DBP and the sponsor’s 
income statement and balance sheet. As pension accounting standards converge to 
international accounting standards, there is an emphasis upon representing the economic 
substance of the pension contract. The economic substance of the transaction results in 
the recognition of the net pension position on the sponsor’s balance sheet if, based on 
employment contracts and other facts, it can be construed that the sponsor underwrites 
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the investment risk of DBP, and non-recognition if the sponsor does not underwrite the 
investment risk. In the USA SFAS 87 and in Australia AASB 119 (December 2004) 
follow the economic substance approach but make compromises to varying degrees to 
accommodate the interests of local constituents.  
 
This paper extends Barth and Clinch’s (1996) use of Ohlson’s (1989) clean surplus model 
to compare current pension accounting standards in the USA, Australia and international 
pension accounting standard. The full economic substance view is used as the theoretical 
benchmark to compare current pension accounting standards. In practice, political 
compromises are introduced into the pension accounting standards that detract from the 
full economic substance view and interrupt the articulation of the sponsor’s income 
statement with the balance sheet. Four incarnations of the economic substance view that 
emphasise the extent of divergence from the full economic substance view are outlined. 
The significance of the articulation or interlocking of the profit and loss and the balance 
sheet is to reduce political compromises and minimise judgement by management with 
respect to pension accounting. These political compromises that result from political 
intervention are not principles-based and reduce the user’s ability to understand the links 
between the sponsor’s income statement, balance sheet and actuarial position of the DBP. 
As a result, comparability between companies is reduced. This paper represents the first 
step towards assessing the current state of comparability for pension accounting and 
suggests that the distinction between rules-based and principles-based accounting 
standards requires further refinement if attributes of financial information, such as 
comparability, are to be properly researched. For example, a distinction between rules 
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present in current accounting standards that result from political bargaining (as in pension 
accounting) and rules that are based on principles needs to be made. Although this paper 
uses a theoretical benchmark to compare pension accounting standards, it may have 
general application to other accounting standards. 
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Yes 
Financial position: net pension position 
recognised in sponsor’s balance sheet 
Performance: recognise net change in DBP in 
sponsor’s income statement 
Outcome: rules-based pension accounting standards that are not based 
on principles do not result in more useful information for external 
decision-making 
Political process (unprincipled rules-based):  
• compromised neutrality (Daley and Tranter, 1990; Nobes, 
2005) 
• compromised reliable measurement of pension liabilities 
(Nobes, 2005) 
• compromised faithful representation (Nobes, 2005) 
No 
Financial position: no need to recognise net 
pension position in sponsor’s balance sheet 
Performance: no need to recognise net change 
in DBP in sponsor’s income statement 
Rules-based pension accounting 
standards (SFAS87, IAS19, 
AASB119 Dec 2004) 
• corridor method 
• liability measurement 
¾ professional 
judgement ↓ 
¾ unprincipled rules 
(permit choice) and 
comparability ↓ 
Principles-based pension 
accounting standards (AASB119 
July 2004) 
¾ professional 
judgement ↑ and 
comparability ↓ 
but with 
¾ clean surplus pension 
accounting 
¾ comparability ↑ 
 
Elements of financial (pension) statements: application of economic 
substance over legal form principle. 
Is sponsor, in substance, liable for DBP deficit?
 27
Figure 1: Application of Economic Substance over Legal Form Principle to the Pension Accounting    
Framework 
 
 
Qualitative characteristics of financial (pension) information: 
• understandability 
• relevance – materiality 
• reliability – faithful representation, substance over form, 
neutrality, prudence, completeness 
• comparability 
• constraints – timeliness, benefit / cost trade-off 
• true and fair view / fair presentation 
Principle: economic substance over legal form. Is DBP part of 
sponsor’s economic entity so that it is connected, in substance, to the 
Objective of pension accounting in DBP sponsor’s books: to enhance 
user’s ability to understand the link between the actuarial position of 
the DBP and the sponsor’s financial statements 
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Table 1: Accounting for Economic substance and Legal Entity Form Views 
 
Full Economic substance  
(Preliminary Views; ED 
53; AASB 119 July 2004)  
First Modified Economic 
substance 
(IAS19 before IASB ED) 
Second Modified Economic 
substance 
(AASB119 (December 2004) and 
IAS19 (2004)) 
Mixed Economic substance 
(SFAS 87) 
(December 1985) 
Legal View 
(AASB 1028) 
(March 1994) 
Balance sheet 
• Recognise net pension position 
(pension asset or pension 
liability) 
 
Balance sheet 
• Recognise net pension position (pension 
asset or pension liability) 
 
Balance sheet 
• Recognise net pension position (pension asset 
or pension liability) 
 
Balance sheet 
• No recognition of pension asset. 
Recognition of minimum liability as a balance 
date calculation (measured as accumulated 
benefit obligation minus fair value of plan assets 
at balance date) and after adjusting for the 
pension cost already recognised (SFAS87) has a 
ceiling for the minimum liability equal to 
unrecognised prior service cost 
Balance sheet 
• No recognition 
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Full Economic substance  
(Preliminary Views; ED 
53; AASB 119 July 2004)  
First Modified Economic 
substance 
(IAS19 before IASB ED) 
Second Modified Economic 
substance 
(AASB119 (December 2004) and 
IAS19 (2004)) 
Mixed Economic substance 
(SFAS 87) 
(December 1985) 
Legal View 
(AASB 1028) 
(March 1994) 
Income statement 
• Change in net pension position 
classified as: 
• service cost  
• interest cost 
• AGL 
• return on plan assets 
and recognised immediately in 
profit and loss (for Preliminary 
Views and AASB 119)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income statement 
• Change in net pension position classified 
as:  
• service cost 
• interest cost 
• AGL 
• return on plan assets 
with adoption of:  
1. Immediate recognition in profit and loss (as 
under full economic substance method) or 
2. Deferral of the recognition of AGL in the 
profit and loss to later periods provided the 
method for deferral is systematic and 
consistently applied or 
3. Deferral of the recognition of AGL in the 
profit and loss using the corridor method 
 
 
Income statement 
• Change in net pension position classified as:  
• service cost 
• interest cost 
• AGL 
• return on plan assets 
with adoption of:  
1.Immediate recognition in profit and loss (as 
under full economic substance method) or 
2.Deferral of the recognition of AGL in the profit 
and loss to later periods provided the method for 
deferral is systematic and consistently applied or 
3.Deferral of the recognition of AGL in the profit 
and loss using the corridor method 
 
Income statement 
• Change in net pension position classified as: 
• service cost 
• interest cost 
• AGL 
• return on plan assets 
with deferral of the recognition of AGL in the 
profit and loss using the corridor method (or any 
other systematic method applied consistently to 
both gains and losses and which results in greater 
amount of amortisation than corridor method)  
 
 
 
 
Income statement 
• Cash contribution 
to the fund 
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Full Economic substance  
(Preliminary Views; ED 
53; AASB 119 July 2004)  
First Modified Economic 
substance 
(IAS19 before IASB ED) 
Second Modified Economic 
substance 
(AASB119 (December 2004) and 
IAS19 (2004)) 
Mixed Economic substance 
(SFAS 87) 
(December 1985) 
Legal View 
(AASB 1028) 
(March 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Retained earnings 
• No direct-to-retained earnings 
adjustments (except on initial 
adoption) 
Retained earnings 
• No direct-to-retained earnings adjustment 
(except on initial adoption) 
Other (comprehensive) income statement 
• For items not included in operating income 
statement above, that is: 
• AGL 
• Return on assets options are: 
1. Recognition in Statement of Total Recognised 
Gains and Losses (outside profit and loss) as an 
immediate direct-to-retained earnings adjustment 
Retained earnings 
• Direct-to-equity adjustment for debit side of 
minimum liability 
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l Economic substance  
ry Views; ED 
; AASB 119 July 2004)  
First Modified Economic 
substance 
(IAS19 before IASB ED) 
Second Modified Economic 
substance 
(AASB119 (December 2004) and 
IAS19 (2004)) 
Mixed Economic substance 
(SFAS 87) 
(December 1985) 
Legal
(AAS
(March 199
 View 
B 1028) 
4) 
and/or 
2. Recognise effect of asset ceiling in Statement 
of Total Recognised Gains and Losses (outside 
profit and loss) but 
3. Without option to recycle AGL through profit 
and loss at a later date 
 
Ful
(Prelimina
53
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 USA IAS Australia 
Principles-based Preliminary Views  ED 53 
Domestic 
Compromise: 
introduce rules 
FAS 87 Aligned with FAS 87 AASB 1028 
Convergence 
 
FAS 87 IAS 19 introduce more 
options for AGL 
IAS 119 
Convergence 
with increased 
transparency/ 
comparability 
 Discussion Paper 
Preliminary Views on 
Amendments to IAS 19 
Employee Benefits, 
March 2008 
 
    
 
 
